Environmental self-auditing is said to deserve and require encouragement. Although firms can audit themselves more cheaply and effectively than regulators, they are deterred for fear that information they uncover will be used against them. To reduce this disincentive, EPA's "Audit Policy" lowers punitive fines when firms promptly disclose and correct self-discovered violations. While some contend that the Audit Policy is inadequate, EPA touts its success based on the policy's track record. Our examination of that track record leads us to question EPA's claim. Comparing the violations in these cases with those detected by standard EPA enforcement suggests that the typical self-audited violation is relatively minor. Cases arising under the Policy are more likely to concern reporting violations and less likely to concern emissions. The relative insignificance of self-audited violations raises a number of policy questions, including whether the Audit Policy should be revised to play a larger role in enforcement.
Introduction
Growth in the quantity and complexity of environmental regulation over the last several decades has generated a new set of problems for both industries and regulators. One serious challenge arises from a tension that exists between the necessity that firms conduct environmental "selfaudits" and the disincentive to do so arising from possibility that what firms discover will be used against them.
On the one hand, if a firm wishes to be in compliance with environmental regulations-in light of the penalties for noncompliance, including fines, civil liability, and consumer dissatisfaction-it often has no choice but to devote substantial resources to self-investigation.
To achieve compliance at its Texas facilities, for example, Occidental Petroleum must deploy technicians with sophisticated testing equipment to monitor 140,000 points for potential fugitive emissions. The resulting four to seven million data points (Hawks 1998 and Lavelle 1992 ) must then be organized, summarized, and analyzed. In cases like this, purposeful and systematic self-auditing is required if a firm is to identify problems and take appropriate corrective action.
On the other hand, discovering a problem through such an investigation may increase the chance that the problem will be detected by a regulator-or at least firms may perceive this to be the case (Murray 1995 , Moore and Newkirk 1995 , Feeley 1995 , Cooney et al. 1995 .
2 Such a discovery may inspire a disgruntled employee to 'blow the whistle'. Even loyal employees may be subpoenaed to testify against the firm under oath. Documents and computer files generated in the course of a self-audit may be subject to inspection by future litigation opponents, or such records may find their way into unmarked brown envelopes and then onto desks at EPA. In response to this issue, firms may self-audit less frequently and less earnestly than might be expected or hoped.
This tension between the necessity of self-auditing and its disincentive has been apparent since at least the 1990's. In a number of well-publicized instances, firms turned to regulators after discovering that certain practices thought to be innocuous were in fact generating noncompliant emissions (Feeley 1995 discusses the well-known Coors-Colorado case). Instead of being rewarded for correcting problems that the regulators might never have detected, the firms found themselves subject to significant fines, leading them to call for protection against such punishments for violations uncovered as a result of self-auditing.
Several states reacted by creating a new self-evaluative privilege whereby confidential documents produced under a regular program of environmental self-audits are neither subject to discovery nor admissible as evidence in court. 3 Others even proposed immunity for firms voluntarily reporting and correcting noncompliance.
The United States EPA subsequently responded with what some regard as a partial step. In 1995, EPA issued its policy on "Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Violations" (60 FR 66, 706) . A revised Final Policy was issued in May 2000.
Technically, the Policy is a "guideline" for government actors on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and the conduct of settlement negotiation. It concerns the "gravity" component of fines, as opposed to the "economic benefit" component, which is intended to capture gains derived from delaying or avoiding pollution control expenditures or obtaining a competitive 3 For a regularly updated list, see the EPA Region 5 site: http://www.epa.gov/region5/orc/audits/audit_apil.htm. As of August 28, 2001 , this EPA site lists as "Privilege Only" Arkansas, Indiana , Illinois, Mississippi and Oregon, with the first such privilege laws enacted as early as 1993 (Oregon) and others being enacted in the mid-1990s. As of the same date, the same EPA web site lists as having "Immunity Only" just one state, Rhode Island, but also lists under "Privilege and Immunity" (in order of first enactment) Colorado, Kentucky, Minnesota, Wyoming, Utah, Texas, Kansas, Virginia, Michigan, Idaho, South Dakota, South Carolina, New Hampshire, Ohio, Montana, advantage (14 ELR 30001). The gravity component of a fine will be reduced by 100% for a firm that discovers a violation through a systematic auditing program, voluntarily discloses the violation 21 days after discovery without prompting from the government or a third party plaintiff, corrects the violation within 60 days, takes steps to prevent recurrence and cooperates with EPA throughout. The violation cannot be part of a pattern of repeated violations or be one that has caused or may cause "serious harm." Gravity fines are reduced by only 75% if the violation was discovered outside the context of a systematic program of self auditing but the other conditions are met.
Since the EPA's Audit Policy was first proposed, industry commentators, economists and legal scholars have debated whether the Policy is sufficient (see, e.g., Creighton 1996) . Critics have pointed to several shortcomings. First, the Policy is merely a "guideline" for the regulator containing no enforceable promise of fine reduction for disclosing firms. Second, fine reduction is limited to the add-on gravity component of fines and does not reach the economic benefit component. Thirdly, there is uncertainty about the EPA's intentions regarding criminal prosecution for non-compliance. Fourthly, any fine reduction requires as preconditions that the firm must promptly disclose the violation, promptly correct it, and then take whatever measures EPA sees fit to prevent recurrence. Because of these perceived shortcomings, calls for broader action continue to emanate from industry, the states, and several members of Congress.
EPA maintains that its Audit Policy is more than adequate and also that farther reaching "secrecy and amnesty" policies such as those adopted by some states are seriously overbroad.
EPA has threatened to revoke regulatory authority from states that adopt such policies (see, e.g., FRL 6576-3, p.31). Fortunately, EPA makes comprehensive data on self-reported violations available. We use these data to assess the success of EPA's Audit Policy in a more systematic fashion.
We first show that the great majority of the violations reported to EPA under its Audit
Policy are indeed like the GTE case, in that they involve a failure to report or to inventory hazardous materials. In contrast, self-reporting of actual emissions has been rare.
Yet the fact that most self-reported violations concern reporting or inventory might simply reflect the composition of the full set of violations. To test this we compared these self-reported violations with those that EPA itself uncovered under its standard enforcement procedures. The difference in composition is dramatic. As the matrix below (summarizing Table 2 Innes' work (1999a Innes' work ( and b, 2000 Innes' work ( , 2001 emphasizes the problem that firms have insufficient incentive to remediate violations unless and until those violations are detected by the regulator. He proposes making fines contingent on the firm's pre-detection remediation costs.
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More generally, the present paper contributes to a growing literature analyzing innovative efforts to increase compliance at low cost. In particular, two approaches other than self-audits that have been advocated for environmental settings. First, several commentators have proposed that firms form alliances to work cooperatively with both NGOs and government.
Such relationships could improve the credibility of firms' environmental claims and could also lower compliance costs and/or improve environmental outcomes by permitting greater flexibility and creativity in addressing environmental regulations (Arora and Cason 1995; Gunningham, Grabosky and Sinclair 1998; Coglianese and Nash 2001) .
Secondly, commentators have proposed employing education and awareness initiatives to empower citizens to monitor the environment (Ariasingam 1999 ) and challenge firm practices.
Because the environment has no advocate besides the public at large, it is argued, empowering citizens would help to create a favorable 'pollution equilibrium' (Pargal and Wheeler 1995; Dasgupta and Wheeler 1996 discuss, e.g., how citizen complaints trigger regulatory processes).
Moreover, with some form of popular empowerment, local preferences can be taken into account (see Hartman et al. 1997) . The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The second section discusses the source and the nature of our data. The third presents our empirical assessment of the EPA's Audit Policy. Then the final section's discussion considers a suite of explanations for our results and concludes.
Data Sources
The data sets are lists of case records from EPA involving violations of environmental laws.
One set concerns solely Audit Policy cases 7 while the other concerns all other recorded cases.
These data, from EPA's dockets, are the source for all of the analyses whose outputs are below.
For violations uncovered under the Audit Policy, collectively denoted the "Audit Docket,"
hard copies of case files were furnished by the EPA for audit proceedings from 1994 to 1999.
From the hard copy case records we encoded for each audit case the Case Number, Case Name, Law and Section violated. Also, using our best judgment, we chose the best match from the list of Violation types used by EPA in their standard enforcement practices (see appendix for list).
These Audit Policy case records include two values for the fine imposed: first, the proposed penalty, as per standard EPA rules; and second, the actual penalty, after the fine reduction for having participated in the Audit Policy process. Proposed penalties seem to be the better measure of severity, reflecting the standard enforcement procedures. With few exceptions, we know only the total fine, not the gravity and benefit components. Recall that fine reductions are 7 We use the following standard terminology throughout: A "case" is a single violation or a collection of violations identified and processed as a group by the regulator. A "violation" is a specific event or condition (e.g., emissions of a given quantity of a given chemical from a given source) paired with a specific legal dictate (e.g., a specific portion of a specific subsection of a specific statute regarding such emissions). The legal dictate determines what constitutes a unit event or condition. A "statute" or "law" is a set of legal dictates typically passed by the legislature in the form of a package (e.g., the Clean Air Act). A "section" of a law, or "law section," (e.g., Clean Air Act § 111(e))) may itself contain subsidiary sections, and even the most elemental of these may contain more than one legal dictate. (As is common practice, we refer to the section number of the Congressional Act, rather than the section number assigned in incorporating the Act into the full U.S. code-i.e., in "codifying" it.). Therefore, each violation is associated with a single law section. But each law section may give rise to several violations. This is both because a given law section may contain several legal dictates and also because a single not always 100% for gravity and do not apply at all to the economic-benefit fine component.
The 137 cases in the Audit Docket include approximately 3400 violations (the observations for Tables 1 and 2 vary slightly due to missing values). 8 We refer to the non-Audit-Policy cases as the "Standard Docket," which EPA provides in two parts, Administrative and Civil Dockets (for our purposes they are similar 9 (Tables 1A-B and Tables 3A-C) . For Table 2, we have no reason to believe that the observations missing from the Standard Docket differ systematically from those that are present. In any event, even if we assume that the missing legal dictate may have been violated more than once in a given case. 8 Another six cases provided by EPA had no value recorded for the number of violations. This number of cases is consistent with the 670 figure in the EPA quote in the Introduction because the latter refers to actual or potential violations, i.e. it includes cases where no violations were found as well as many cases that were still under review. 9 Administrative cases are adjudicated in the agency's own quasi-judicial system. Civil cases are adjudicated in the courts. In the courts, the remedies may be more severe, but EPA has less control over process outcomes. Specifically, we will compare the Audit Policy cases to the standard cases in three ways.
First, we will examine the laws (and sections) that have been violated. Second, we will examine the types of violations (e.g., reporting versus emissions). Finally, we will compare the penalties. Table 1A Table 1B, which shows the sections of each law that were violated, depicts the dissimilarity even more starkly. EPCRA Section 302 comprises close to 60% of the Audit violations, but essentially does not appear in the two Standard dockets. Further, the five sections that make up almost 90% of the Audit violations make up less than 10% of Administrative and 5% of Civil.
Comparing Laws and Sections Violated
To get a sense of what these differences mean (and to preview Table 2 Table 2 In the Administrative and Civil cases, less than 20% and 5% of the violations, respectively, are REP, TRI or NONOTE. More generally, for each violation type, the fraction of Audit cases differs to a statistically significant degree, from that type's fraction of Administrative and Civil cases.
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While REP is the most common violation among Administrative cases, at 14%, the next is PRMTVL (permit violation), at 10%, then EFF (effluent) and NOPRMT (discharge without a permit) at over 6% each. PRMTVL (7%) and NOPRMT (6%) rank second and third in Civil, while EMIS (emissions) is fourth, at 6 %, and both NSPS (new source performance standard) and NESHAP (national emission standard for a hazardous air pollutant) each make up almost 5% as well. The key point for our purposes is that, other than REP, all these violations involve actual emissions. 17 As above, for ANOVA in a regression context (i.e., docket dummies) comparing Audit to Administrative for the major violation types, the lowest t statistic on docket difference is 3.0, next lowest is 10.8, and the average is 35.7. 18 Here dropping CERCLA cases makes little difference since most CERCLA records did not have violation codes. Tables 3A, 3B and 3C use average fines per violation to compare the severity of violations. are the lowest and, given the number of observations, this difference is statistically significant.
Fines as a Proxy for Severity
19 Table 3A --average fines by docket
The averages in Table 3A suggest that the differences seen in Tables 1 and 2 there are so few Audit cases that the mean Audit fine, and thus also the difference in mean fines, may well not be a good predictor of future Policy outcomes (statistically, note that the 95% confidence interval around the difference in mean fines includes zero for CAA, which is not the case for any other law, although CERCLA comes close again because of having very few Audit cases). 19 Recall that for different reasons, the observations used here and below are about half of those used for the Tables  1A-B. For the Standard Docket, about half the fines are missing (and we have tested for robustness to interpreting those as zeros). For the Audit Docket, about 1500 violations are from cases with violations of multiple laws and we are not comfortable dividing the single fine value across the multiple violations (doing so equally as we do when multiple violations are of the same law, though, lowers the mean fine above). For Standard, we drop less than 2% of violations for this reason. Also, using only single-violation cases we find these results are essentially the same. Note also that the docket dissimilarities above are robust to whether the multiple-violation cases are dropped. For instance, if the fractions in Tables 1A and 1B are re-computed using only the first violation in each record, the results remain. For Table 2 , still REP and TRI would be the violation types for over 70% of the cases in the Audit Docket. In any case, treating each violation in a record separately and counting them all seems the better approach. Table 3B --average fines by law by docket Table 3C disaggregates Table 3B by law and section. To keep the table manageable, The only types of cases for which Audit Policy violations are more severe concern reporting. What explains the distinctive character of the Audit Docket? We discuss below a set of candidate explanations. Determining whether the Policy should be revised, and if so how, requires first understanding the reason for the current policy's limited application.
Bad Deal: The easiest explanation is that EPA's offer of special dispensation for selfreporters is simply not attractive enough to induce firms to participate. But the bare assertion that the Policy is a "bad deal" for firms does not explain the fact that self-reported violations have been skewed towards less significant reporting and record-keeping violations.
Red Herring: One explanation for the "small fry" nature of the Audit cases lies in the possibility that firms are using the Audit Policy strategically. It is tempting to speculate that at least a few firms have disclosed relatively minor violations in order to distract attention from major unreported violations. Thus, a firm might happily bring to the attention of EPA its six hundred reporting and recording violations in the hope that this bounty will help to satisfy the enforcement appetite of local and national regulators and thereby lower the probability or intensity of future external audits. Such disclosures might help to favorably dispose the regulator toward the firm. Alternatively, the regulator (or its agent) might be separately interested in the number of firms that have been subject to regulatory action without regard to the nature of that action. Discussions with EPA personnel on this possibility are nuanced and inconclusive. Adjusting future audit probabilities is certainly not consistent official EPA policy.
However, some EPA programs do reward 'good behavior.' And EPA has certainly emphasized breadth over depth in touting its Audit Policy. In any event, it seems important to keep in mind that firms' decisions to disclose are conscious choices that are likely driven by their perceived best interests.
Structure of Fine Reduction:
Another explanation starts with the fact that EPA reduces only the gravity component of fines for firms that have self-reported, while still assessing in full the economic benefit component of the fine-i.e., the dollar value of cost savings and competitive gains derived from noncompliance. This implies that the benefits of self-reporting are greatest for violations for which the gravity penalty is the major component of the total penalty. As argued below, fines for reporting and recording violations are likely to have a large gravity component.
Consider a violation with total fine F, a fraction x of which constitutes the gravity portion.
Imagine that the (risk neutral) firm believes there is a p chance that EPA will detect the violation on its own if the firm does not self-report. Assuming a 100% reduction in the gravity component for self-reporting, the firm pays a fine of F(1-x), if it reports, and faces an expected fine of pF, if it does not. Self-reporting is best when pF >F(1-x), i.e. when x > (1-p). Thus, the firm self reports when the gravity portion of the fine exceeds the chance of going undetected.
The overall fine F has no independent impact on the firm's decision of whether to self-report (a feature consistent with our dissatisfaction with the "bad deal" hypothesis presented above.)
It seems plausible that the gravity portion of total fines is relatively large for violations that involve the failure to report or record information. The economic benefits of noncompliance in this case consist mainly of savings in monitoring costs, clerical costs and legal fees, which are likely to be less significant than the cost savings from ignoring actual emissions (i.e., from not replacing pollution control equipment, not properly treating waste water before releasing it into a nearby estuary, or not taking costly precautions in handling of hazardous substances). Further, the factors EPA uses to determine the gravity component include several factors that do not increase in proportion to the severity of the violation. These factors include: the size of the violator, the extent to which the violator fell short of the requirement, the presence of compliance problems in the region, and whether "the violator already has instituted expeditious remedies to the identified violations prior to the commencement of litigation" (14 ELR at 30001, 30002 and 30007). Additionally, EPA policy calls for the routine imposition of a "nontrivial" gravity component on top of economic benefits to insure deterrence. For less severe violations, these "fixed cost" elements of the fine could make the gravity component relatively large.
The available data do not permit systematic testing of these hypotheses. But what evidence there is on the linkage between self-reporting, the relative size of the gravity component, and the seriousness of violations is consistent with the story just laid out. In the GTE case, for example, the economic-benefit component of the fine for failing to report the sulfuric-acid-filled batteries was only $52,264, while the gravity component from which GTE was excused as a result of self-reporting was $2.38 million, or 98% of the total fine (EPA March 1998). Pfaff and Sanchirico 2000 show that requiring disclosure is not necessary for effective fine
reduction. An effective audit policy could address disincentives simply by reducing fines to the extent that a firm's self-investigation aided in the detection of a known violation. The important feature of the policy is that expected fines-taking into account any increased probability of detection resulting from self-auditing-remain roughly constant whether or not a firm has self-audited. When this is the case firms have nothing to lose from systematically investigating all potential violations, not just those that they are willing to admit to EPA.
Indeed, given the possibility that their disclosures to EPA may be used against firms in private suits (a possibility not explicitly modeled in Pfaff and Sanchirico 2000) , the disclosure requirement could itself be biasing Audit cases towards reporting and record keeping violations.
Many environmental statutes allow "citizen suits" against a violator in certain circumstances.
The law in this area is complex and unsettled, and its review is well beyond the scope of this article. (See Stubbs 2000 /2001 . In rough outline, however, it would appear that a reporting violation (especially under EPCRA, which accounts for nearly three quarters of the Audit Docket violations) that is corrected and disclosed cannot generally form the basis of a subsequent private suit. On the other hand, if a firm corrects and discloses illegal emissions under, for example, the Clean Water Act (which accounts for a plurality of the Administrative Docket), any harm caused by these emission is more likely to support a claim for recovery by private plaintiffs.
Given these hypotheses for why Audit Policy outcomes differ starkly from standard EPA outcomes, the next step is to gather empirical evidence on their viability. To test the red herring story, the EPA could experiment in selected jurisdictions with announcing an explicitly independent inspection probability rule in a manner that would convince firms that disclosure under the policy will not affect their chance of being the object of a standard audit. With regard to the structure of fines story, this could be tested with field data, were that data collected and made available by EPA. Lastly, EPA could experiment with a self-audit policy that did not require firm disclosure, but rather reduced fines when there was evidence that the firm's selfauditing facilitated EPA's detection of the violation. 20 .
In closing, it should be noted that resolving the question of why the Audit Policy has been so skewed in application is only necessary and not sufficient for comprehensive evaluation of the policy. Under several of the answers to this question that we have proposed, one might still argue that the Policy serves a good purpose. When a firm turns in a minor violation, one might assert, it saves EPA resources to pursue major violations. And yet, the opposite effect is also possible, as EPA may be obliged to deal with these minor violations. Just as a prosecutor may have less time to investigate serious crimes if she must respond to every confession that is brought to her attention, the cases that result from the Policy could in principle cause a less than beneficial reallocation of regulatory funds. Thus, the magnitude of resource savings and the 20 For more detail on how this alternative to disclosure might work, see the discussion of the first proposed solution extent of resource diversion are also important questions for further research, ones that might be resolved on the basis of EPA budget and management data.
in Pfaff and Sanchirico 2000. 
